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This paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory, where an 
uninformed principal manipulates a dynamic decision-making process without 
employing any tailored contractual device. We demonstrate the principal’s mind-control 
method through which he can effectively utilize social psychology tactics to incentivize 
informed agents to announce their information in keeping with his wishes. We show 
that with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he 
wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if the psychological cost of each 
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1.  Introduction 
  
 
This paper investigates a decision problem that involves a principal’s attempt to 
select the alternative that is most compatible with his wishes despite being unaware of 
which alternative would be the most desirable. Besides the principal, there are many 
agents who possess private signals about such possible alternatives. Hence, the principal 
requires these agents to disclose these private signals in the form of an announcement. 
In order to obtain the information from the agents, the principal has to devise various 
ways with which to incentivize each agent to reveal the information that would help the 
principal determine the desired alternative. However, in this case, it is insufficient for 
their obedient announcement to satisfy incentive compatibility, because there may exist 
other self-enforcing announcements by them that are not true to the principal’s wishes, 
thereby preventing the principal from arriving at his desirable alternative. Hence, in 
addition to incentive compatibility, the principal has to utilize additional incentive 
devices that eliminate unwanted equilibria; in other words, the principal needs to obtain 
their obedient announcements as the unique Nash equilibrium. 
The issue of uniqueness has been studied intensively in the standard theory of 
implementation; it was generally assumed that agents care only about their material 
benefits as shortcuts and enjoy full autonomy in making their announcements. 
Following this assumption, the authors in the literature pertaining to this field have 
generally confined their attention to inventing material-based contractual devices, such 
as the modulo mechanisms (Maskin [1977/1990]); and the Abreu-Matsushima   4
mechanisms (Abreu and Matsushima [1992]) that implement, at least in the virtual 
sense, any value of the fixed social choice function as the unique Nash equilibrium 
outcome in compensation for artificial tailoring.
1 
In contrast to this standard theory, any real person cares about not only material 
benefit but also any psychological factor of social influence; the person experiences 
feelings of guilt for disobeying the authority’s wishes, and this feeling is intensified 
when he expects his reference group to obey this authority’s wishes. In this regard, 
several studies in social psychology such as Ash (1955), Milgram (1974), Zimbardo et 
al. (1977), and Hofling et al. (1966) have commonly reported that subjects in 
laboratories and fields tended to be obedient to the authorities
2 and tended to seek 
conformity to their reference groups’ behavioral modes.
3 
On the basis of the above arguments, we demonstrate a new concept for the 
implementation of the principal’s desirable alternative as follows. From the vast store of 
knowledge pertaining to social psychology and daily life, it is natural to infer that the 
aforementioned principal pragmatically considers how to utilize social psychology 
tactics to influence the agents with respect to their choice of announcements.
4 With  the 
continuous time horizon, given the incentive-compatible decision function, the principal 
will manipulate the decision-making process in the following ways. 
                                                 
1 For the surveys on the standard theory of implementation, see Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), and Maskin and Sjöström (2002). 
2  Many of these experiments reported that the subjects are obedient to the authority, even if the 
authority attempts to disturb social order. 
3  For issues on social influence in general, see Cialdini (2001). 
4 Attempts to incorporate social psychology into economics are not new but are attracting 
growing interest. See, for instance, Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Geanakoplos, Pearce, and 
Stacchetti (1989), Bernheim (1994), Gneezy (2005), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), and 
Bébabou (2007).   5
(i)  The agents are required to make their announcements at the initial time.  
Each agent can make a different announcement at any later time and as many 
times as he wants. 
(ii)  This process is randomly terminated at a constant hazard rate. According to 
the decision function, the principal selects the alternative that corresponds to 
the announcements that are effective at the terminal time. 
(iii)  During this process, the agents are prohibited from communicating with or 
monitoring each other. 
In addition to this process manipulation, we shall take into account a concept of 
social psychology that we refer to as expectation-based obedience. Expectation-based 
obedience implies that the degree to which each agent experiences feelings of guilt with 
regard to disobeying the principal’s wishes depends to a great extent on his expectations 
about the other agents’ behavioral modes; in other words, as a rule, an agent will 
experience greater feelings of guilt about disobeying the principal’s wishes if he expects 
that no agent has been disobedient before. Thus, if he expects that someone has already 
disobeyed the principal’s wishes before, he does not necessarily experience guilt. 
Since the process manipulation prohibits monitoring and communication, there is 
no room for an agent to influence the other agents by being disobedient himself; there is 
no means for him to incite disobedience and eliminate feelings of guilt experienced by 
members of his reference group. In other words, manipulating the dynamic 
decision-making process in the above manner is assumed to allow the principal to 
successfully defend himself against any possibility of civil disobedience from the agents, 
a real-life example of which would be the Montgomery Bus Boycott by Rosa Parks that   6
eventually led to the modern civil rights movement in the United States.   
The result of this paper is quite permissive from the principal’s viewpoint; even if 
an agent’s psychological cost of disobeying is small as compared to his total material 
benefits, the principal can incentivize the agents to make announcements obediently at 
all times, that is, he can implement any alternative that he wishes as the unique Nash 
equilibrium outcome. 
Since the decision-making process is randomly terminated in a continuous time 
horizon, any point-wise change of announcement hardly influences the alternative 
choice. Moreover, according to expectation-based obedience, each agent can slightly 
reduce his psychological cost by waiting for someone else to disobey. This tiny 
psychological cost reduction, along with random termination, is sufficient to trigger a 
tail-chasing competition among the agents, eliminating all possibilities of them 
beginning to disobey the principal’s wishes in due order. 
Our tail-chasing competition stems from the basic concept of Abreu-Matsushima 
mechanisms (Abreu and Matsushima [1992]) explored in the standard theory of 
implementation; the standard theory was generally devoted to inventing material-based 
contractual devices. In contrast, the present paper shows that if there is a little room for 
the principal to infringe on the agents’ autonomy, the principal can apply the same logic 
as the standard theory to the invention of mind-control methods, rather than contractual 
devices. 
The earlier works of Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) took into account the   7
psychological aspects in the implementation literature.
5  These works, however, did not 
introduce expectation-based obedience, and therefore, still needed to consider tailored 
contractual devices à la Abreu-Matsushima to incentivize the agents. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model. Section 3 
introduces expectation-based obedience. Section 4 presents the main theorem that 
represents the unique Nash equilibrium wherein agents make announcements obediently 
at all times. 
                                                 
5 There are a few other works in the implementation theory that are relevant to psychological 
aspects, such as Eliaz (2002) and Glazer and Rubinstein (1998).   8
2.  The  Model 
 
 
Let  {1,2,..., } Nn ≡  denote the set of agents, where  2 n ≥ . Let  A denote the set 
of alternatives. Let us consider a decision problem with the continuous time horizon 
[0, ) ∞ , in which, a principal makes an alternative choice according to the following 
process given by  (, , ) M gr Γ ≡ . Let  i M  denote the set of messages for each agent 
iN ∈ . Let  i iN M M
∈ ≡×  denote the set of message profiles. At the initial time 0, the 
principal requires each agent i to announce any message,  ii mM ∈ . Further, at any 
time after the initial time 0, an agent can change his message as frequently and 
whenever he wants. 
We assume that at any time, any agent cannot monitor the other agents’ 
announcements, and therefore, changes in choice by an agent are not contingent on the 
other agents’ past announcements. This assumption is crucial in the present study since 
it takes away any means of civil disobedience available to the agents. On the basis of 
this assumption, we define a strategy for agent  i  as a function  :[0, ) ii sM ∞→ , where 
() ii st M ∈   denotes the message that agent  i  announces at time  t, that is, the message 
that stands at time t   when the process terminates. We assume that  i s  is 
right-continuous, that is, for every  0 t > , either 
() () ii st st =   for  all tt ≥  , 
or there exists  tt ′>  such  that 
() ( ) ii st st ′ ≠ , and  ( ) ( ) ii st st =   for  all  [, ) tt t ′ ∈  .   9
Let  i S   denote the set of strategies for agent  i. Let  i iN SS
∈ ≡ ×   denote the set of strategy 
profiles. Let 
\{ } ij jN i SS − ∈ ≡×  for  each iN ∈ . 
The principal randomly terminates the dynamic decision-making process at a 
constant hazard rate (0, ) r∈∞ . For every  [0, ) t∈ ∞ , the probability that this process 
terminates at or after any time  t  is given by 
exp( ) rt − . 
When the process terminates at time  t, the principal makes an alternative choice on the 
basis of the message profile  ( ) ( ( )) ii N st s t M ∈ = ∈  that has been announced at terminal 
time  t; he selects the alternative  ( ( )) gst A ∈  according to the decision function given 
by : gM A → , along with the message profile  ( ) st  announced at the terminal time  t. 
An additional account for this process is given as follows. Before the initial time 0, 
the principal explains his wishes to each agent, in words such as “I wish to aid the 
poorest persons.”
6 The principal then requests each agent to provide a message 
containing any relevant information that is unknown to the principal, asking questions 
such as “Where do the poorest persons live?” Given that the agents have announced a 
message profile  mM ∈  at the randomly determined terminal time, the principal will 
regard the corresponding alternative  ( ) gm A ∈  to be the desirable one in light of his 
wishes. 
For each  iN ∈ , let us set a message 
*
ii mM ∈  as  the  truthful message for agent  i, 
which indicates the obediently announced message by agent  i, i.e., the best answer by 
                                                 
6 The arguments in this paper are irrespective of whether the principal’s wishes are prosocial, 
antisocial, or neither.   10
agent  i in line with the principal’s wishes. Let 
** () ii N mm M ∈ =∈  denote the truthful 
message profile. We define the truthful strategy 
*
ii sS ∈  for  agent i by 
** () ii st m =  for  all  0 t ≥ . 
According to 
*
i s , agent i  obediently announces information at all times. Let 
** () ii N ss S ∈ =∈  denote  the  truthful strategy profile. 
Let us denote the payoff function for agent i  by  : i US R → , where  ( ) i Us 
implies the payoff for agent  i  when he follows the strategy  ii sS ∈   and he expects the 
other agents to follow the profile of strategies  ii sS − − ∈ . We define a game as a 
combination of the dynamic decision-making process and the profile of the payoff 
functions, given by ( ,( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ . A strategy profile sS ∈  is said to be a Nash 
equilibrium in the game of  ( ,( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ   if for every  iN ∈ , 
   () ( , ) ii i i Us Uss − ′ ≥  for  all  ii sS ′∈ . 
We assume that the payoff  ( ) i Us for  agent i  is separated into two parts: 
() () () ii i Us Vs Ws =−. 
The first part  ( ) i Vs is called the material benefit, and the second part  ( ) i Ws the 
psychological cost. The material benefit  ( ) i Vs implies the expected value of the 
intrinsic utility given by  ( ) i va R ∈ , which is derived directly from the alternative 
choice, that is, 
0
( ) ( ( ( ))) [1 exp( )] ii
t
Vs vgs t d r t
∞
=
≡− − ∫ . 
Let us assume incentive compatibility in terms of the intrinsic utility in that each agent   11
can maximize his intrinsic utility by obediently making announcements, provided he 
expects the other agents to do the same; hence, for every  iN ∈ , 
(1)    
** (( ) ) (( / ) ) ii i vg m vg m m ≥  for  all  ii mM ∈ . 
From this assumption, it is clear that for every  iN ∈ , 
(2)    
** () (/) ii i Vs Vs s ≥  for  all  ii sS ∈ , 
which implies that each agent can maximize his material benefit by obediently 
announcing information at all times, provided he expects the other agents to do so at all 
times, too. 
 Any  agent  iN ∈  cares more or less about any psychological factor of social 
influences that determine his psychological cost  ( ) i Ws. We assume that any agent feels 
guilty about being disobedient at any time, if he expects the other agents to obediently 
announce information at all times; thus, for every  iN ∈ , 
(3)    
** () (/) ii i Ws Ws s <  for  all 
* \{ } iii sSs ∈ . 
It is implicit in this assumption that the degree to which any agent  i can reduce his 
psychological cost is very limited.   12
3.  Expectation-Based  Obedience 
 
 
Let us introduce another assumption on  ( ) i Ws   that we refer to as 
expectation-based obedience. For every 
* /{ } ii i sSs ∈ , we define  ( ) [0, ) ii ts∈∞  by 
   
* (() ) ii i i sts m ≠ , and 
* () ii st m =   for  all  ( ) ii tt s <  , 
which indicates the first time that agent  i makes a disobedient announcement. Let us 
denote 
* () ii ts =∞. For every  0 t >  and every strategy 
* /{ } ii i sSs ∈  for agent i, we 
define another strategy  , it i sS ∈  for  agent i as  follows: 
*
, () it i st m =   for  all  [0, ) tt ∈  , and  , () () it i st s t =   for  all tt ≥  . 
According to  , it s , agent  i  continues to obediently announce information until time  t, 
while he follows  i s   at or after time  t.  Let  us  define 
2 (,)
max | ( ) ( ) | ii i
aa A
Lv a v a
′ ∈
′ ≡− , 
which implies the upper bound of differences in intrinsic utility for agent  i. 
 
Expectation-Based Obedience: For every  iN ∈ , every  /{} j Ni ∈ , and every  sS ∈ , 
if 
    ( )( )( ) ii j j hh ts ts ts ≤≤ for  all  /{} hNi ∈ , 
then   13
(4)    
,( )
0
() ( , )
lim exp( )











The degree to which each agent feels guilty about disobeying the principal’s 
wishes depends on his expectation about the other agent’s behavioral modes; his 
feelings of guilt about being disobedient would increase if he expects no agent to have 
been disobedient in the past, rather than otherwise. In other words, if he expects 
someone to have already been disobedient, he does not necessarily experience guilt. 
Hence, he can relieve his feelings of guilt by postponing his first act of disobedience to 
after another agent is disobedient, that is, by avoiding having to be the first person to 
behave disobediently. 
To be more precise about expectation-based obedience, let us suppose that agent  i 
is the first person to be disobedient, whereas agent  /{} j Ni ∈   is the first person except 
for agent  i to be disobedient. Then, by postponing his first act of disobedience from 
time ( ) ii ts to time  ( ) jj ts ε + , agent i can avoid being the first person to behave 
disobediently; thus, he can save his psychological cost by a positive amount of 
,( ) () ( , ) 0
jj ii i t s i Ws Ws s ε +− −> . Given that  ε  is positive but close to zero, the inequality 
(4) in expectation-based obedience implies that the reduction in costs that happen in this 
manner is greater than 
exp( ( )) ij j Lr rt s ε − . 
Expectation-based obedience carries an implicit assumption that the degree to which 
each agent  i  can save his psychological cost is very limited.   14
 
Example: Let us denote the psychological cost of each agent  i by 
0
( ) ( ; ) [1 exp( )] ii
t
Ws ws t d r t
∞
=
≡− − ∫ . 















     if  ( ) ii ts t ≤  and  ( ) ( ) ii hh ts ts ≤  for 
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where  0 λ > ,  0 η > , and the function  : {0,1} ii M ι →   is defined by 
* ()0 ii m ι = , and  ( ) 1 ii m ι =  for  all 










 implies the proportion of the time that agent  i is disobedient 
when the decision-making process terminates at time t . Hence, the greater this 
proportion is, the greater is his psychological cost. 
More importantly,  0 η >   implies the additional increase in the psychological cost 
when the agent becomes the first person to be disobedient in his expectation. Since the 
presence of this positive value  0 η >   renders the left-hand side of (4) equal to infinity, 
our example automatically satisfies the expectation-based obedience irrespective of the 
specification of the hazard rate  r .   15
Our example also satisfies 
2 (,)
max ( ) ( ) i
ss S
Ws Ws λ η
′ ∈
′ −≤ + . 
Hence, by letting  0 λ >  and  0 η >  close to zero, we can make the differences in 
psychological cost as close to zero as possible.  This implies that each agent’s 
psychological cost of disobeying the principal could be negligible as compared to his 
total material benefits.   16
4.  The  Theorem 
 
 
  We demonstrate the main theorem of this paper, according to which the principal 
can implement any alternative that he wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. 
 
The Theorem: The truthful strategy profile 
* s  is the unique Nash equilibrium in the 
game of  (, ( ) ) iiN U ∈ Γ . 
 
Proof: It is clear from (2) and (3) that 
* s  is a Nash equilibrium; for every  iN ∈  and 
every 
* /{ } iii sSs ∈ : 
** * * () () (/) (/) ii i i i i Vs Ws Vs s Ws s −> − , i.e., 
** () (/) ii i Us Us s > . 
Let us consider any other strategy profile 
* /{ } sSs ∈ , where there exist iN ∈  
and /{ } j Ni ∈  such  that 
() ii ts<∞, and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ii j j hh ts ts ts ≤ ≤  for  all  /{} hNi ∈ . 
Let us choose  0 ε >   close to zero. From (1), along with the definition of  i L , it follows 
that 
,( ) () (/ )









ii i t s
tts
v gst v gst s t d r t ε +
=









ii i t s
tt s
















vg m st vg m d r t
=










vg s t vg s t m d r t
ε +
=
+− − − ∫  
[exp{ ( )} exp( { ( ) })] ij j j j Lr t s r t s ε ≤−− −+ , 
which is approximated by 
exp( ( )) ij j Lr rt s ε − . 
From (4), along with the sufficiently small  0 ε > , it follows that 
,( ) ( ) ( / ) exp( ( ))
jj ii i t s i j j Ws Wss L r r ts ε ε + −> − . 
From these observations, we have shown that 
    ,( ) () (/ )
jj ii i t s Us Uss ε + −  
,( ) ,( ) () (/ ) { () (/ ) }
jj jj ii i t s i i i t s Vs Vss Ws Wss εε ++ =− − −  
    exp( ( )) exp( ( )) 0 ij j ij j Lr rt s Lr rt s ε ε <− −− = , 
which implies that  s  is not a Nash equilibrium. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  In order to reduce his psychological cost, each agent may prefer postponing his 
first act of disobedience until after any other agent is disobedient. However, a difficulty 
is presented when postponing his disobedient announcement, because in this manner, he   18
is caught between the reduction in psychological cost and the loss in material benefits, 
which are commonly caused by message changes from a disobedient one to an obedient 
one. 
Expectation-based obedience can overcome this difficulty as follows. Suppose that 
any agent can avoid being the first person to be disobedient by postponing his 
disobedient announcement for a short interval. Expectation-based obedience implies 
that the probability that the decision-making process terminates during this interval is 
kept low enough to render the expected value of loss in the intrinsic utility less than the 
reduction in the psychological cost. Hence, this low probability can trigger a 
tail-chasing competition among the agents that perpetually edges their first acts of 
disobedience upward, thereby eliminating unwanted equilibria. 
With respect to the functioning of tail-chasing competition, our model is closely 
related to the basic concept of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism (Abreu and 
Matsushima [1992]). In the mechanism, each agent announces multiple messages
7 and 
is motivated to avoid being the first person who makes an announcement that is 
inconsistent with the first messages, triggering a tail-chasing competition among the 
agents. 
There are substantive points of difference between our model and the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism; in order to trigger the tail-chasing competition, the 
Abreu-Matsushima mechanism uses any contractual device of side payments (or similar 
to this), stipulating that any agent is fined by a small amount of money if and only if he 
                                                 
7 In the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism, the number of messages that each agent actually 
announces is fixed; this number is not fixed in our model since the decision-making process 
randomly terminates.   19
is the first person to make an announcement that is inconsistent with the first messages.   
The Abreu-Matsushima mechanism requires more complicated contractual devices
8 
that incentivize the agents to make their first announcements truthful. Our model, on the 
other hand, does not use any such contractual device at all. 
  Throughout this paper, it was assumed that each agent cannot monitor the other 
agents’ announcements until the process terminates. If we permit each agent to monitor 
them, we need to investigate a version of the repeated games and struggle with the 
multiplicity of equilibria implied by the folk theorem or some similar principle. By 
allowing monitoring in this manner, any agent may have an incentive to take the 
initiative to make a disobedient announcement at an early stage in order to free the other 
agents from the authorities’ spell. I believe that this point would be substantial with 
respect to the issue of implementation and mind control, but is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
                                                 
8Matsushima (2008a, 2008b) introduced psychological costs into the Abreu-Matsushima 
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